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ABSTRACT 
Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a 
‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this article asks whether the  personal 
injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such 
justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury 
system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of 
compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that 
common citizens would chose that system, which exists only because it is effectively 
compulsory. Constructing a market in first person insurance would put the existence of the 
personal injury system to the test of actual choice. 
 
INTRODUCTION: PERSONAL INJURY AS A SYSTEM OF INTERPERSONAL 
JUSTICE 
To those, like myself, who are convinced that tort liability for personal injury1 should be 
abolished in countries such as the UK which aspire to have an adequate system of what I 
shall persist in calling social security2 against incapacity,3 academic commentary on 
 
* I am grateful to Allan Beever, James Davey, Richard Lewis, Annette Morris, John Murphy, Andrew Robertson 
and the editor and his two anonymous reviewers for their comments. 
1 I will not discuss the law of other losses caused by negligence, but I will state that I believe that the argument 
of this paper can easily be extended to cover medical malpractice. 
2 I understand this term very broadly so as to include health services, social care, etc. 
3 I will not discuss, much less attempt to defend, social security provision, but it may help the reader if I say that 
my thinking on the issues discussed in this paper is based on Beveridge’s principle of ‘adequacy of benefit’: 




negligence now presents a mixed picture. On the one hand one can detect a welcome 
increased frankness about the, it must be said, deplorable state of negligence doctrine. One no 
longer feels one’s views are entirely unusual when one maintains that the jurisprudential 
harm caused by the line of cases decided in the appeal courts between Anns v Merton LBC4 
and Murphy v Brentwood DC5 has not been confined to this or that ‘principle’, ‘test’, 
‘framework’ or whatever for determining the existence of a duty of care but has undermined 
the very idea that such determination is justiciable. Anns was perhaps the worst,6 but it was 
nevertheless but one, of a large number of cases the results of which were ‘sanctified as core 
legal principles … which finally must be overruled because their containment by 
distinguishing has become a farce’.7 The point is that, as it is put in one of the best accounts 
of the existing law, ‘the duty of care is determined entirely by policy … and its putative 
principles are entirely illusory’.8  
 But, on the other hand, to the extent that this concession is made, it seems to be 
tolerable to those who broadly support the personal injury system because they base that 
support on what we might call ‘meta-doctrines’ of negligence which decouple the appellate 
law from the personal injury system’s acknowledged failings in respect of what had been 
regarded as its defining goals of compensation and deterrence. The success of the philosophy 
 
destruction of earning power … The scheme embodies six fundamental principles … The fourth fundamental 
principle is adequacy of benefit in amount … The flat rate of benefit proposed is intended in itself to be 
sufficient without further resources to provide the minimum income needed in all normal cases. It gives room 
and a basis for additional voluntary provision, but it does not assume that in any case’: Sir William Beveridge 
Social Security and Allied Services (Cmd 6404, 1942) paras 17, 307. 
4 [1978] AC 728 (HL). 
5 [1990] 2 All ER 908 (HL). 
6 Perhaps a new dimension of unsatisfactoriness has been explored by Lord Hoffmann’s recent admission that 
the decision in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd and Others [2002] UKHL 22; [2003] 1 AC 32 was 
flatly wrong: L Hoffmann ‘Fairchild and After’ in A Burrows et al (eds) Judge and Jurist: Essays in Memory of 
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry (Oxford University Press, 2013) 68. I understand that Lord Hoffmann had previously 
made this confession in a lecture given in Canada in May 2011 and subsequently published as ‘Fairchild in 
Retrospect’ (2012) 39 Advocates Quarterly 257. I was not alone in regarding this decision as very costly 
nonsense when it was handed down, but for this reason as wholly unsurprising. I was very surprised by this 
admission by Lord Hoffmann. 
7 J Getzler ‘Patterns of Fusion’ in P Birks (ed) The Classification of Obligations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997) 191-2. 




of corrective justice has turned the disregard of how the personal injury system actually 
functions which has long characterised abstract tort jurisprudence almost into a principle.9 
The undermining of that philosophy which would seem to follow from showing, yet again, 
that the personal injury system normally does not, because it cannot, effect the posited 
correction is avoided in the theory of civil recourse’s claim that the possibility of bringing a 
tort action is a redress mechanism which can be justified because its mere availability 
enhances social solidarity.10   
In a recent number of this journal Professor Andrew Robertson has, on the basis of a 
major review of English and Canadian duty of care cases,11 made the latest contribution to his 
important attempt to add to this meta-doctrinal sort of line.12 In a sense, but only in a sense, 
conceding what I have said about the quality of negligence doctrine, Robertson seeks to 
nullify its destructive implications by arguing that they are confined to a relatively limited 
number of high level appeal cases which turn on what he calls ‘community welfare’ policy 
considerations.13 Cases and reasoning of this sort, he argues, ‘play a relatively minor role’, 
indeed a ‘marginal’ role in England and Wales: ‘while the ultimate appellate courts in the UK 
 
9 E Weinrib The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press, rev edn, 2012) ch 6. 
10 In respect of the specific issue addressed here see BC Zipursky,‘Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice’ 
(2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 695) (and see also EJ Weinrib ‘Civil Recourse and Corrective Justice’ 
(2011) 39 Florida State University Law Review 273). The modern statement of this type of argument can be 
traced at least to Linden’s claim that a proper law of tort ‘helps to keep the peace … because it permits an 
aggrieved person to recover money in court rather than to spill blood on the streets’ (one of a number of 
rhetorically striking ways in which Linden framed this claim): AM Linden ‘Auto Accident Compensation in 
Alberta: Toward Peaceful Coexistence’ (1968) 6 Alberta Law Review 219, 224. 
11 A Robertson ‘Policy-based Reasoning in Duty of Care Cases’ (2013) 33 Legal Studies 119. This argument 
must be put in the context of the general reflections on the role of policy in adjudication in A Robertson 
‘Contraints on Policy-based Reasoning in Private Law’ in A Robertson and Hang Wu Tang (eds) The Goals of 
Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009). 
12 On Robertson’s views on the interesting, so far largely Australian, theory of ‘civil peace’, which also allows 
an argument that, even though it cannot be justified or even explained in terms of ‘compensation, deterrence or 
standard setting … by doing justice between individuals, the law of negligence serves a broader community 
welfare purpose … the maintenance of civil peace’: see A Robertson ‘On the Function of the Law of 
Negligence’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31, 42, 32. 
13 Robertson also does not believe that the fact that these cases have turned on policy considerations to the 
extent that they may be described as political in the pejorative sense necessarily has to lead to the chaos to 
which it unarguably has led, and in his paper in this journal he summarises an argument he has previously 
advanced for a change of approach that he believes would make such policy considerations justiciable: A 




… routinely take account of community welfare considerations, the lower courts in … 
England seldom do’.14 The great bulk of ‘the day-to-day work of the courts on duty of care 
questions’15 is concerned with the articulation of what Robertson calls ‘interpersonal justice’: 
While the courts are now commonly understood to make ‘value judgments’ 
instead of applying ‘universal rules’, the notion of interpersonal right and wrong 
remains the underlying idea. As Lord Atkin observed in Donoghue v Stevenson, 
the relevant legal standard is informed by commonly accepted ideas about the 
moral obligations that people owe one another, but is ultimately concerned to 
identify ‘moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay’ … Lord Atkin’s 
characterisation of the relation that gives rise to an interpersonal responsibility to 
be mindful of the interests of others has proved, as a description, to be difficult to 
improve upon.16 
I write this paper, not because I wish to address Robertson’s argument in its own 
terms,17 but because that argument has stimulated in me the thought that ‘interpersonal 
justice’ is, indeed, the fundamental issue we should consider when deciding whether the 
personal injury system should be abolished. For even if those taking my position in what is 
generally called the ‘compensation debate’ are correct that the personal injury system does 
not compensate or deter when evaluated on any of the criteria of economy, effectiveness or 
efficiency we normally use to decide whether investments of resources are justified, this 
would not ultimately matter if that system resulted from a sense of interpersonal justice 
rooted in common citizens’ beliefs. I fully accept that, were this to be the case, the objections 
I have to the personal injury system, which I would continue to maintain were well-founded, 
would not ground abolition of that system. Democracy certainly trumps efficiency in my 
 
14 Robertson ‘Policy-based Reasoning in Duty of Care Cases’, above n 11, 121. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid, 122; quoting Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL(SC)) at 580 (emphasis added by Robertson). 
17 No doubt the distinction between community welfare and interpersonal responsibility central to Robertson’s 
argument is open to criticism for misrecognising abstract negligence liability principles (and, behind this, for its 
application of a broadly Dworkinian jurisprudence to these principles). I should make it plain that I myself find 
it generally unpersuasive, and the claim that foreseeability and proximity as they inform the neighbour principle 
are ‘two considerations that clearly fall on the justice side of the line’ (Robertson ‘Policy-based Reasoning in 
Duty of Care Cases’, above n 11, 122), breathtaking. Having read all of Robertson’s cases from England and 
Wales, I have found it difficult to usefully separate them into his two classes. But I leave all this to those better 




view of politics and, as I trust will emerge from what follows, equating democracy and 
efficiency is the core of my normative economics.  
Now, this thought about interpersonal choice does not directly reflect on Robertson’s 
argument, which is meta-doctrinal in the strong sense that it is concerned with the policy 
ideas which inform negligence decisions when both specific considerations about community 
welfare and ‘broad determinations as to what is just between the parties’ are regarded as 
forms of policy.18 Indeed, that the state’s ‘instrumental concerns’ are pursued in terms of 
interpersonal morality at all is itself a matter of policy for Robertson.19 ‘[T]he question is … 
what standard of interpersonal conduct the state requires people to observe’,20 and, of course, 
the state imposes its own standards about what harms it will recognise that do not entirely 
congruently map onto common beliefs; this indeed is the very burden of Lord Atkin’s famous 
words: 
acts or omissions which any moral code would censure cannot in a practical 
world be treated so as to give a right to every person injured by them to demand 
relief. In this way rules of law arise which limit the range of complainants and the 
extent of their remedy. The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes, in 
law, you must not injure your neighbour’.21  
The strength of the link between what the state requires and what common citizens believe is 
a question which Robertson leaves open or indeed about which he is unconcerned in the work 
I am discussing. I must make it plain that I do not think this stance is tenable or that 
Robertson consistently maintains it. When he tells us that ‘the relevant legal standard is 
informed by commonly accepted ideas’, he is in my view conceding the necessity of some 
link to common citizens’ beliefs, just as much as did Lord Atkin himself when, in the very act 
of distinguishing the neighbour principle from common beliefs he acknowledged that ‘the 
 
18 Ibid, 121. 
19 Robertson, above n 12, 42. 
20 Robertson ‘Policy-based Reasoning in Duty of Care Cases’, above n 11, 121. 




liability for negligence … is no doubt based upon a general public sentiment of moral 
wrongdoing for which an offender must pay’.22 
But I put this to one side as it is also not an issue which I wish to address. I wish, 
somewhat against Robertson’s intention, to regard the concept of interpersonal justice as a 
claim that a common belief that there is a class of moral wrongdoing for which the offender 
must pay is the source of legitimacy of the personal injury system. I am spared the problem of 
determining the precise strength of this claim for I believe it has no strength whatsoever. I 
will argue that the personal injury system as it actually, because necessarily, functions gives 
tantamount to no effect to this belief. I will then argue that a way of ascertaining common 
citizens’ views about a correct policy towards personal injury is readily available, or rather, 
would be readily available save that using it requires the abolition of the personal injury 
system.  
 
WHAT DO WE THINK IS INTERPERSONALLY JUST? 
As I have said, I will regard interpersonal justice as a claim that it is commonly believed that 
there is a class of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. Making this claim is 
dependent on separating negligence doctrine from an understanding of the way the personal 
injury system has been shown to function in the compensation debate. In the interest of 
brevity in discussing an issue most aspects of which have been very thoroughly canvassed 
indeed23 and on which I have already had my say,24 I will merely state the principal points: 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 Published in 2001, T Baker ‘Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action’ 
(2001) 35 Law and Society Review 275 appeared too late for inclusion in D Harris et al Remedies in Contract 
and Tort (Cambridge University Press, 2002) ch 24. It is the only at all recent contribution which, in my 
opinion, does say something fundamentally novel about the operation of the personal injury system. I hope it 
goes without saying that I do not mean to disparage those contributions which either deal with new 
developments or which, like, indeed, Robertson’s, have put forward a fresh way of looking at facts which are 
nevertheless now well known.  
24 Ibid. Non-pecuniary loss is discussed in this chapter. Quantification generally is discussed in chs 22-3 written 




(1) if ‘must pay’ is understood to mean effectively compensate the harm caused by the ‘moral 
wrongdoing’, then this is a most inaccurate account of the operation of the personal injury 
system, in which, leaving aside the hazards of establishing liability, the quantification of 
damages, a subject normally not discussed in the formal tort jurisprudence or the teaching of 
tort, always bears only a very weak relationship to compensation, and, in regard of non-
pecuniary loss, no relationship at all; 
(2) if by ‘the offender’ who must pay is meant a responsible individual, then this case is so 
rare that it can be put to one side as an exceptional state of affairs in descriptions of the 
working of the personal injury system. The real payers are insurance companies, 
overwhelmingly third party liability insurers, and almost all the remainder are large 
undertakings such as local authorities which self-insure by making provision for their 
liabilities from within their own budgets. Insofar as it is a matter of anything other than 
natural concern for one’s own well-being and the well-being of others, optimisation of the 
levels of deterrence of the actions covered by the law of negligence is achieved, to the extent 
it is achieved, by the criminal law and regulatory sanctions; 
(3) if it is claimed that ‘moral wrongdoing’ is ultimately identified by the views of common 
citizens, then this is to ignore the shaping of tort liability by the institutional structure of the 
personal injury system. The identification of a solvent tortfeasor is essential to the claims 
process, and, in a system dominated by liability insurance (as the personal injury system 
ultimately is bound to be unless insurance against negligence is forbidden, which would itself 
 
In the subsequent decade, the principal change that has taken place has done something to confirm my 
observation that ‘[i]t is very hard to conclude that a system which cannot be made to run better without 
imposing a welfare loss is other than indefensible’: (ibid 449). Changes in fee arrangements and in the handling 
and publicisation of the claims process has led to a worrying increase in motor accident claims which call the 
integrity of the claims process into doubt and are reflected in a serious rise in insurance premiums: House of 
Commons Transport Committee Fourth Report: The Cost of Motor Insurance, HC (2010-12) 591. (The 
Committee also published three follow up Reports, two of them Government responses to the Committee’s 




lead to the disappearance of the system), the incidence of solvency is largely a function of the 
market conduct of the insurer; 
(4) liability insurance dominates the operation of the law of negligence because negligence is 
not a voluntary system. It is essentially a system of compulsory indemnification of third 
parties by an insurer responding to the occasions and standards of mandatory liability set by 
the state, though the standards are principally set by the courts rather than directly by 
legislation.25 It is an anomaly in market economies in which economic goods are still 
principally allocated by voluntary contractual choices to exchange, with government 
expenditure playing a very important yet subsidiary role. In England and Wales, negligence 
must clearly be distinguished in its nature and effects, even in these days of privatisation and 
quasi-markets, from social security against incapacity. 
In sum, though there are some aspects of damages which are compensatory and though 
liability may be borne by some individual tortfeasors, to describe the personal injury system 
as a system of compensation and of deterrence is akin to describing the Sahara as a wetland 
because there are oases in it. The point I am trying to make, however, is not that, as a 
deterrent of or as compensation for accidentally inflicted personal injury, much less as part of 
a social response to incapacity in general, negligence liability is almost entirely unfit for 
purpose, though I believe this is so. My point is that the shortcomings of the personal injury 
system not only make it wrong to believe that that system usefully contributes to the social 
response to incapacity or to the deterrence of undesirable conduct, but also make it wrong to 
believe that the law of negligence reflects the sense of interpersonal justice of common 
citizens. We must ask the following question outright: as negligence liability has no 
functional justification in terms of a social response to incapacity, does it have a democratic 
justification in the views of common citizens? 
 
25 The role of legislation in tort law has recently been most interestingly re-examined in TT Arvind and J Steele 




Let us go to the nub of the matter by concentrating only on the law of England and 
Wales, and only on non-pecuniary loss in personal injury cases. Though this is of course a 
restricted focus, I believe it is justified because it is, as a matter of law in action, what the 
personal injury system is overwhelmingly about. With Ms Morris, Professor Lewis has 
recently authoritatively surveyed what that system actually does, and quotation of the 
relevant part of their account, which rather depressingly is highly reminiscent of Lewis’ 
previous accounts, will put the discussion on a proper footing: 
financial loss comprises but a small part of the overall damages bill. Instead it is 
non-pecuniary loss that accounts for a disproportionate amount of damages. Pain 
and suffering and loss of amenity comprised two thirds of the total awarded thirty 
years ago, and it has remained at about that level. The extraordinary importance 
given to pain and suffering, as opposed to financial loss, reflects the fact that most 
awards are for minor injury and involve relatively small sums. The average 
payment is less than £5,000, which is approximately two months’ average salary. 
In these minor cases claimants suffer very little, if any, loss of earnings and rarely 
incur medical costs. Future financial loss occurs in only 7 per cent of cases and 
amounts to less than 9 per cent of the total damages bill. Where road accidents are 
involved, 70 per cent of the injuries in recent years have been attributed to the 
effects of whiplash. Claimants are then often left with symptoms which are 
difficult to disprove. In practice … the claimants in tort who suffer catastrophic 
effects as a result of their accident are very unusual. Instead, nearly all suffer very 
minor injuries and soon make a full recovery. They are not left with any 
continuing ill effects. In most cases the accident does not even result in a claim 
for social security benefit. It is these minor injury cases which account for the 
extraordinarily high costs of the system compared to the damages it pays out … 
the essential point to note … is that the image of the tort system as caring for the 
immediate financial needs of mostly severely injured people in society is far from 
the reality.26 
The overwhelmingly typical personal injury claim will, then, result in a small payment 
for non-pecuniary loss which it stretches credulity to argue is compensation of even that loss. 
Its quantum is irrational (save as determined by convention) and its payment fruitless. It is a 
windfall. One might argue that it is a solatium, but the point is that this is never given as the 
reason for the payment. If one gives concrete content to the ‘payment for wrongdoing’ that is 
actually made, it would, I suggest, be completely mistaken to claim that there is general 
 





consensus behind this. Maintaining that the personal injury system ultimately reflects the 
beliefs of common citizens could have plausibility only if one assumes that a finding of 
liability normally leads to a remedy in any sense of the word which conveys respect for the 
the values of security against incapacity and of legality. But this is precisely what one cannot 
assume. I submit that common citizens would not support the personal injury system if they 
were aware of what it does, which follows from the inevitable limits of what that system can 
do, for it simply cannot be described as a rational response to moral wrongdoing for which 
the offender must pay. 
It may, of course, very well be the case that common citizens believe that the personal 
injury system deters and compensates, but, as it doesn’t, and as belief in a proposition which 
is wrong is analytically distinct from a belief in the same proposition when it is right, the 
personal injury system cannot be grounded in interpersonal justice. A belief cannot be held 
for the same reasons when it is right and when it is wrong. When it is right, that is the reason 
it is held. When it is wrong, there must be another element of the belief, one that, mistakenly, 
leads to its being thought to be right. At issue here is what I have called ‘a continuing, 
stygian, popular ignorance of what the personal injury system actually accomplishes or can 
accomplish’ as an essential condition of the preservation of that system.27 
This is, in my opinion, the indisputable core of sense in the in other respects very vexed 
claim that the personal injury system has been an important cause of the growth of an 
unwelcome ‘compensation culture’.28 An explanation of why we have adopted the personal 
injury system cannot emerge from examination of the formal law of negligence, for that law 
does not even normally discuss the remedies the personal injury system actually provides, 
 
27 Harris et al, above n 24, 409. 
28 The value, or otherwise, of this concept is authoritatively reviewed in R. Lewis et al ‘Tort Personal Injury 
Statistics: Is There a Compensation Culture in the UK?’ (2006) 14 Torts Law Journal 158; A Morris, ‘Spiralling 
or Stabilising? The Compensation Culture and our Propensity to Claim Damages for Personal Injury’ (2007) 70 
Modern Law Review 349; A. Morris ‘The Compensation Culture and the Politics of Tort’ in Arvind and Steele 




much less that system’s failure to compensate or to deter. It must be based on an analysis of 
the process of legal emergence which gives the formal law of negligence the significance it 
has despite its failure to acknowledge its own actual consequences. I am not competent to put 
forward a legal history of this emergence, though I am aware and readily acknowledge that 
such a history shows the creation of much of negligence liability, largely prior to the 
establishment of the universal welfare state, to be perfectly justifiable at the time.29 I wish to 
show only that this history now necessarily involves eschewing the use of the market 
mechanism by which we normally identify the legitimate choices of common citizens about 
investments of resources. 
 
INTERPERSONAL JUSTICE, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND INSURANCE: 
COERCION OR CHOICE? 
As I have observed elsewhere, criticism of the personal injury system which would lead to 
the universalisation of full compensation would be regarded as utopian were it agreed that the 
immense expansion of welfare provision which universal full compensation requires is a 
good thing, which it is not.30 The compensation debate in the Commonwealth which 
appeared entirely stalled because of this utopianism was revived by Professor Stapleton’s 
answering what the Pearson Commission had found to be the unanswerable question of what 
to put in place of the personal injury system.31 Stapleton’s answer,32 from which she 
 
29 eg PWJ Bartip and SB Burman The Wounded Soldiers of Industry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983) and PWJ 
Bartrip Workmen’s Compensation in Twentieth Century Britain (Aldershot: Gower, 1987). But on the 
justifiability of the current position see R Lewis, ‘Employers’ Liability and Workmen’s Compensation: England 
and Wales’ in K Oliphant and G Wagner (eds) Employers’ Liability and Workers’ Compensation (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2012). 
30 Harris et al, above n 23, 461 
31 Lord Pearson (Chair) Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal 
Injury (Cmnd 7054, 1978). The shortcomings of the Person Commission’s findings were thoroughly exposed in 
DK Allen et al (eds) Accident Compensation After Pearson (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1979). 




famously resiled,33 but which Professor Atiyah has substantially affirmed for the UK,34 was 
to do nothing, or, more precisely, to do nothing in addition to providing social security for 
incapacity. One part of the claim that social security provision is justified is that it represents 
the choice of common citizens expressed through a legitimate collective decision-making 
procedure: representative democracy. Except in the sense that a collective decision of this 
sort has not been taken to abolish it,35 and that therefore the courts and other public bodies 
support its operation,36 the personal injury system cannot claim legitimacy in this way. What 
legitimacy can this public/private hybrid claim? 
 It is here that reflection on interpersonal justice as I am regarding it seems to me to 
indicate a way forward. If the ultimate point is to reflect the views of common citizens, it is 
time to determine what should be done by actually consulting those views. Of course, this has 
in a sense been done in opinion surveys which have shown considerable support for the 
 
33 J Stapleton ‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology’ (1995) 58 Modern Law Review 820. The extraordinary 
implications of this very important article for the consideration of the actually existing relationship of personal 
injury law and liability insurance are criticised in R Lewis ‘Insurance and the Tort System’ (2005) 25 Legal 
Studies 85; J Morgan ‘Tort, Insurance and Incoherence’ (2005) 67 Modern Law Review 384 and R Merkin 
‘Tort, Insurance and Ideology: Further Thoughts’ (2012) 75 Modern Law Review 301. The whole subject has 
recently been extensively reviewed in R Merkin and J Steele Insurance and the Law of Obligations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2013) nb ch 13. 
34 PS Atiyah ‘Personal Injuries in the Twenty-first Century: Thinking the Unthinkable’ in P Birks (ed) Wrongs 
and Remedies in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996) and PS Atiyah The Damages Lottery 
(Oxford: Hart 1997). Atiyah’s omission of motor accident insurance from his proposals on what he believes are 
grounds of practical politics, ibid, pp 185-8, is highly damaging to those proposals, in my opinion completely 
undermining them. Cf R Lewis ‘No-fault Compensation for Victims of Road Accidents: Can it be Justified’ 
(1981) 10 Journal of Social Policy 161. 
35 The closest the UK Parliament came to doing so was, of course, some 14 years after Donghue v Stevenson, 
when the Labour government which introduced the universal welfare state considered the possibility: Sir Walter 
Monckton (Chair) Final Report of the Departmental Committee on Alternative Remedies (Cmd 6860, 1946) para 
25. The decision to retain the damages system, though in a form that was perhaps intended to lead to its 
withering away, divided the Committee, and was taken despite the Committee as a whole finding that: 
‘substantial advantages would be gained were it found possible to abolish the remedy by action and to substitute 
for it rights to benefits under national insurance’. 
36 In the provision of evidence about claims to insurance investigators, in the attempt to criminalise fraudulent 
claims, in the calculation of benefit payments in light of insurance claims, etc. The policy relationship between 
welfare legislation and tort is most perceptively analysed in R. Lewis ‘Recovery of State Benefits from Tort 
Damages: Legislating For or Against the Welfare State’ in Arvind and Steele (eds), above n 25. At 288 Lewis 
repeats the argument he has made many times about the principal way the state supports tort in the UK. Were it 
not for the existence of social security as a relatively effective way of dealing with incapacity caused by 
accident, which props up the relatively extremely ineffective way of doing so by tort, ‘it is unlikely that the 




system.37 But, as with all such surveys, the opinions expressed in them beg the essential 
question, for they are merely abstract, being decoupled from the commitment of resources 
which gives them their meaning. To really base the decision about what personal injury 
system we should have, or whether we should have one at all, on the views of common 
citizens will require those citizens to make an actual choice based on them directly bearing 
(above a floor of social security against disability) the risk of harm from personal injury. This 
simply cannot be done by a law of negligence which gives rise to compulsory indemnity 
insurance. As it is, the very nature of the personal injury system means that common citizens 
are not linked to what Lord Atkin called payment, save in an almost negligible fashion. In 
order to explain what I mean, it is necessary to step back and say something about the 
concept of choice. 
 It is one of the claims essential to liberal market economics that there is something 
unique to the process of making an economic choice which those economics capture in a way 
superior to any other approach to choice.38 An economic choice is a choice about the 
allocation of limited resources which must involve an opportunity cost. The point I am trying 
to make is that such a choice must, as I have recently seen it graphically put, make the 
chooser squirm.39 Not all choices are like this. But one simply does not make an economic 
choice unless one includes the squirm factor.  
 One of the virtues of a market economy is that exchange by individual economic actors 
normally possesses the squirm factor, for those actors voluntarily commit an identified part of 
their limited personal resources to that exchange. Their being obliged to, as it were, tangibly 
back their choices will tend to promote an awareness of opportunity cost and a responsible 
attitude towards making those choices, though, of course, it does not necessarily do so. The 
 
37 Law Commission Damages for Personal Injury: Non-pecuniary Loss [1998] EWLC 257, appendix B. 
38 L Robbins The Nature and Significance of Economic Science (London: Macmillan, 2nd edn 1969) chs 1-3. 
39 EA Schmidt ‘The Missing Squirm Factor in Amartya Sen’s Capabilities Approach’ in SE Esquith and F 





sense of responsibility which is likely to follow from exchanges to which individuals have a 
voluntary, identified personal resource commitment is harder to generate when that 
commitment is relatively remote and ultimately involuntary, as is the case with public 
expenditure, which analytically is a political redistribution of resources backed by coercion.40 
To identify coercion as essential to public expenditure does not, of course, mean that all 
public expenditure is illegitimate. There are overwhelmingly powerful arguments that 
interventionist public expenditures guided by collective decision-making may often maximise 
welfare. One of these arguments is that markets themselves can often function unacceptably 
poorly. 
 If an economic actor is asked whether he or she would like to be provided with a good 
without incurring the costs of its provision, then it is, of course, rational to reply with an 
unqualified yes. But it would be wrong to say that the actor chooses the good in such a case. 
The point is that no choice is involved. Liability insurance is based on making remote the 
connection between being provided with a good and bearing the cost of it, for the cost is, in 
the first instance, borne by a third party. This not only is an incentive to fraud, but it works 
against responsible choice. I want to put to one side the mixture of good and bad reasons for 
the current law and practice of liability insurance which emerge from the history of 
negligence liability and ask what we should do faced with the personal injury system we have 
now. 
There is nothing fundamentally novel in the substance of what I will now say and I can 
therefore be very brief. If we want to find out what common citizens would do about the risk 
of personal injury caused by the negligence of another, we should abolish the existing law of 
personal injury caused by negligence and leave it to those citizens to buy first party insurance 
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cover, above a floor of adequate social security,41 if they so wish. Adopting such a policy is, 
in my opinion, possible only if retail insurance markets work tolerably well, and recent 
evidence of the performance of vital financial markets may lead one to conclude that such 
adoption therefore is impossible.42 Certainly, any reform intended to create a market in this 
area cannot be seen as deregulation but must involve extensive re-regulation by 
government.43 But we nevertheless can say that a first party insurance market would in 
principle reveal the preferences of common citizens in a way which liability insurance in 
principle simply cannot do.44 
I myself do not believe that the choices of common citizens, mediated by first party 
insurance, would yield anything like the results of the existing law of negligence leading to 
liability insurance. In particular, whilst one can readily envisage the sufficiently highly paid 
insuring against loss of earnings, I do not believe that any insurance market whatsoever 
would emerge for protection against the risk of non-pecuniary loss, and this would, given the 
situation described by Lewis and Morris, amount to the abolition of the personal injury 
 
41 A comment on a draft of this paper by Professor Lewis leads me to emphasise at this point that I write this 
paper as a socialist whose main criticism of the personal injury system is that its existence makes rational and 
just welfare provision for incapacity impossible: Harris et al, above n 23, 449-61. My thinking relies heavily on 
the criticisms of the existing personal injury system by those, represented in the UK by Lewis, who postulate a 
welfarist alternative something like the New Zealand scheme, but I cannot agree with their making what seems 
to me to be an indefensible special case for accidents.  
42 Behind the question of how well insurance markets conceived along broadly conventional lines operate or 
could plausibly be made to operate lies the more profound question of how far such markets represent the 
optimum range of institutions for handling risks not borne publicly. The legal literature has recently been 
comprehensively reviewed (albeit the focus is on US materials) in LA Fennell, ‘Unbundling Risk’ (2011) 60 
Duke Law Journal 1285. I will not discuss this at all. 
43 R Abel ‘General Damages are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a 
Great Idea)’ (2006) 55 DePaul Law Review 253, 324: ‘If people really value general damages enough that they 
want to insure them, the state should correct the market imperfections that prevent this and, as a last resort, sell 
such loss insurance itself’. I cannot, on this particular occasion, resist breaking my self-denying ordinance about 
exploring the history of the discussion of the issues by pointing to Beveridge’s 1942(!) discussion of the ways in 
which the state might, ‘by regulation, by financial assistance or by itself undertaking the organisation of 
voluntary insurance’, set the framework for the provision of first party insurance, in part to ensure ‘that in 
buying life assurance persons of limited means should be guided by advice from a seller which is wholly 
disinterested’: Beveridge, above n 3, paras 375, 188. 
44 Very considerable confusion has been created because the views of Judge Posner (and Professor Landes) on 
negligence are typically identified with ‘the market’: WS Landes and RA Posner, The Economic Structure of 
Tort Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) chs 3-5. Their reasoning for a negligence regime, 
based on Posner’s concept of wealth maximisation, is in fact an alternative to allocating goods by voluntary 
exchange: D Campbell, ‘Welfare Economics for Capitalists: The Economic Consequences of Judge Posner’ 




system in anything like its current form.45 Putting fraud to one side, it is now only rational for 
an economic actor to take any opportunity to seek what is called compensation for non-
pecuniary loss. But such an actor would not pay for this opportunity. No rational economic 
actor will pay the premium for insurance that serves little or no purpose.46 I do not believe 
that common citizens would choose to pay for most of what is now provided by the personal 
injury system were the burden of choice made actual. 
I could, of course, be wrong about this. But the time for speculation or policy-making 
on behalf of, rather than by, common citizens is long since past, and it is for this reason that I 
think interpersonal justice as I have interpreted it valuably highlights the essential issue, 
which is not whether the personal injury system compensates or deters, but whether it can 
claim to rest on the views of common citizens. But whilst it is not implausible to say that 
common citizens would subscribe to an effective system of payment for moral wrongdoing, it 
is utterly implausible to say that this means that common citizens subscribe to the existing 
personal injury system, for that system does not work as an economical, effective or efficient 
system of payment for moral wrongdoing at all, nor can it possibly do so. We could test this 
by creating a proper market in personal injury liability, but we do not do so. 
If one is trying to give effect to the voluntary choices of economic actors, it is wrong in 
principle to begin by comparing the results of loss and liability insurance systems from the 
sub specie aeternitatis position of the theoretical economic planner. I say this with the 
greatest hesitation as this is the very position adopted in Professor Clarke’s introduction to 
insurance law, where perhaps the most influential single British comparison of the merits of 
loss and liability insurance concludes that: 
 
45 A comment on a draft of this paper by Professor Murphy leads me to say that my point is not that liability 
insurance is currently unattractive to insurers, though it seems it is (C Parsons ‘Moral Hazard in Liability 
Insurance’ (2003) 28 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 448). It is that a first party insurance market in non-
pecuniary loss would be completely unattractive to premium payers.  
46 I believe that my point survives the pointing out of the incontrovertible fact that deceiving customers into 




the issue is difficult … the debate has no clear winner … any general conclusions 
for loss insurance and liability insurance are suspect … perhaps the Australian 
judge, who said that the merits of loss insurance should not be assumed but 
should be tested in each situation, was right.47 
Well, test it then. It is not a test for the state to impose specific forms of third party liability 
(which of necessity have a chilling effect on first party insurance). If Clarke’s argument that 
it is hard to know what to do is right, as to some considerable degree I believe it is, then 
surely this is an argument for the state not to intervene as it does not know what to do. It tells 
us something about policy-making in this area, as in so many areas, that not knowing what to 
do is taken to be a reason for intervention when this is a very powerful reason not to 
intervene. 
 
CONCLUSION: THE JUSTICE OF CHOICE 
Much tort scholarship proceeds in blithe disregard of the way the actual remedy provided in 
personal injury cases almost completely contradicts the abstract remedy assumed by such 
scholarship. When the discussion is moved to what I have called the meta-doctrinal plane of 
overt consideration of corrective justice or of civil recourse, the unreal quality of the 
discussion is generally but little diminished as the law in action barely approximates to the 
still abstract claims being made. The concept of interpersonal justice central to Professor 
Robertson’s discussion of the role of policy in the law of negligence is meta-doctrinal in this 
way, but I have wrenched the concept away from his use in order to ask whether we can 
possibly conclude that the personal injury system is based on common citizens’ beliefs about 
interpersonal justice. If we could reach this conclusion, this would not make the personal 
injury system just, in my opinion, for it would still be open to much criticism, but it would 
 
47 M Clarke Policies and Perceptions of Insurance Law in the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
rev edn, 2007) 330. The dicta cited was that of Stephen J in Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v Dredger ‘Wilhelmstad’ 
(1976) 11 ALR 227 (High Court of Australia) at 265. I hope not to put words in his mouth when I claim that 





make it justified, and such criticism would not ground abolition but would have to be used in 
an attempt to make common citizens change their beliefs. 
It is not a criticism of the law of negligence underpinning the personal injury system to 
say that it mediates common citizens’ views. All law mediates in this sense as no law could 
or ever should give unconsidered expression to those views. But it is, or should be, a very 
telling criticism of the law of negligence that the form of mediation of views about the 
response to personal injury to which it has necessarily given rise, essentially general liability 
insurance, makes the personal injury system work in a way which almost completely 
contradicts the universal justification for that system, that there is a class of moral 
wrongdoing for which the offender must pay. Such a system can exist only because it is not 
chosen by common citizens but is imposed on them by legal compulsion, and this is indeed 
the case. As it happens, liability insurance is almost entirely directly compulsory in the UK,48 
but this is less important than the way that the law of negligence, even when it is not 
explicitly compulsory, is, as I have mentioned above, compulsory in the sense that it is the 
product of decisions made principally by the courts about the liability that common citizens 
as neighbours must compulsorily bear.  
There is a form of institutional mediation of citizens’ views that would, I believe, in 
principle much more accurately reflect those views. This would be the construction of a first 
party system of insurance against personal injury above a social security floor. The current 
climate of justifiable extreme scepticism about the operation of financial markets (and, to a 
lesser but itself substantial extent, about the provision of social security) rightly gives added 
weight to concerns that a voluntary market in personal injury insurance would be 
 
48 In the UK, 80% of claims are motor accident claims and 8% of claims are employer liability claims. Insurance 
is legally compulsory in both areas. There is a full account of the compulsory duties to insure in this sense in R 
Merkin and and S Dziobon ‘Tort Law and Compulsory Insurance’ in Arvind and Steele (eds), above n 25 and 
Merkin and Steele, above n 33, 257-60. It would not, in my opinion, unduly stretch this more direct sense of 
compulsory to describe the forms of provision for negligence claims by public authorities in this way, and, to 




unacceptably defective. But, nevertheless, the legitimacy of the market economies rests on 
their giving effect to actual voluntary choice in a way which is superior to any other form of 
general economy, and moving to other forms of allocative mechanism backed by coercion 
requires justification of that coercion in precisely the way that advocacy of the personal 
injury system avoids. It is trite to say that rational debate is necessary, but it is necessary to 
say that rational debate is what we do not have because it is just what the law of negligence 
cannot yield. 
If construction of general first party insurance led to the effective abandonment of the 
personal injury system, as I am certain it would, this should not necessarily be taken as the 
failure of the insurance market. I believe this would reflect the fact that the good of security 
against personal injury in anything like its current form would not be seen as worthwhile by 
those conscious of having to pay for it in the way which is essential to actual economic 
choice. Preventing the recognition that there are a multitude of benefits which should not be 
provided because they are not worth their cost is, it seems, a central feature of the 
compensation culture. 
